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The theme of corporate governance dates back to the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, 
only after the financial crisis in 2000’s decade that affected the entire system and the 
devastating corporate failures, the subject returned to the spotlight. Management and the 
board of directors were accused of not having a proactive attitude and do not 
safeguarding the interests of shareholders. Some cases are related with opportunistic 
attitudes for their own benefit. Thus, the concerns of shareholders led to an exponential 
increase of research in this area and, more specifically, in what refers to the control 
mechanisms that, simultaneously, can alleviate agency problems and contribute to a 
sustainable improvement of company performance. 
This study revisits in a comprehensive way the evolution of the different theories of the 
firm in light of the development of corporate governance, as a fundamental science to 
promote and develop the corporate performance. To this purpose, we examined the 
effect that corporate governance variables have on the performance of companies in the 
UK for the period 2005-2012. We considered five mechanisms of corporate control: 
Board of directors, equity ownership structure, internal control performed by the Board 
Committees, separation of CEO and Chairman roles, and control through the variable 
remuneration. Board ownership, together with the separation of CEO and Chairman 
roles and control through the performance variable remuneration, proved to be the most 
significant mechanisms in the resolution of the equation performance - governance. 
Finally, and based on the literature review and the results obtained, it can be stated that 
corporate governance is a dynamic process in which the different stakeholders should be 
taken into account in order to achieve a common goal - develop a governance model 
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1. Introduction to this Research 
The origins of the word governance can be found in the Latin “gubernare” meaning to 
rule or to steer, and the Greek “Κυβερνηση” which means steering. (…) The idea of 
steersman - the person at the helm - is a particularly helpful insight into the reality of 
governance. 
                  In Tricker (1984), p. 9. 
1.1.Introduction  
The definition of CG is not static and varies according to the analysis that is being 
applied. As Claessens (2003) refers, the definition can be divided into two 
classifications. The first set of definitions focus on a set of behavioral patterns, such as 
“performance, growth, financial structure, and treatment of shareholders and other 
stakeholders”. These sets of definitions are the most appropriate for studies of single 
countries.  The second category concerns with the normative framework: that is, the 
rules under which firms are operating. If the purpose is to make a comparative study, 
this set of definitions will fit well.  
Any definition of governance is directly or indirectly related to one observation that 
Adam Smith’s seminal publication (Smith, 1776) presented and that was the first clue of 
the main theory related to this theme: the Agency Theory. When ownership and control 
of corporations do not perfectly match, there is the possibility of conflicts of interest 
between owners and controllers. This problem combined with the “inability to write 
perfect contracts cost free or monitor the controllers, ultimately reduce the value of the 
firm, ceteris paribus.” (Denis & McConnell, 2001)  
In this sense, CG mechanisms arise as a response to agency problems. As Jensen (1993) 
states, the combination of these mechanisms determines the efficiency and efficacy of a 
company’s governance structure. We will propose an interaction of internal mechanisms 
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where the board ownership allied to the separation of CEO and Chairman roles and the 
remuneration sensitivity to performance proved to be the most significant mechanisms 
for explaining performance. 
1.2.Definitions of Corporate Governance 
There are many definitions that may be referenced but the conceptual foundation is 
present in the definitions cited below:  
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled. 
The boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. The 
shareholder’s role in governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors to satisfy 
themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place. The responsibilities of 
the board include setting the company’s strategic aims, providing the leadership to put 
them into effect, supervising the management of the business and reporting to 
shareholders on their stewardship. (Cadbury Report, 1992) 
Corporate governance is the procedures and processes according to which an 
organization is directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies 
the distribution of rights and responsibilities among the different participants in the 
organization – such as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders – and 
lays down the rules and procedures for decision-making.  (OECD, 2007) 
Corporate governance refers to that blend of law, regulation and appropriate voluntary 
private sector practices which enable the corporation to attract financial and human 
capital, perform efficiently, and thereby perpetuate itself by generating long-term 
economic value for its shareholders, while respecting the interests of stakeholders and 
society as a whole. (Millstein Report, 1998) 
Relative to the economic context in which firms operate, CG can be assumed as only 
part of this. Besides that "business ethics and corporate awareness of the environmental 
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and societal interests of the communities in which a company works, can also impact on 
its reputation and its long-term success” (OECD, 2007). Finally, as Claessens (2003) 
refers, the framework will differ according to the country in analysis, as it depends on 
culture backgrounds and it covers both rules and institutions. The study of corporate 
structures has historically been divided into two models: the Anglo-Saxon model and 
the Germanic model that will be explored on the next chapter. 
1.3.Problem Statement 
The impact of CG variables on a company’s performance has received close attention in 
the literature on CG. As the literature review in the next chapter will demonstrate, there 
is no single model to examine the effect of CG variables on performance measures. 
Another point of discussion in research, whether in CG and the wider field of business 
management, has been how to evaluate the performance of the company. Firm 
performance using Tobin's Q, ROE, ROA, OM and Stock Returns are the most popular.  
To sum up, better CG can add value by improving the performance of companies, either 
through a more efficient management, better asset allocation and similar improvements 
in efficiency. Nanka-Bruce (2009) summarized more than 50 empirical studies that 
analyzed the relation between CG and firm performance from 1972 to 2007 and the 
majority strongly suggest that at the level of the company, better CG leads not only to 
improved rates of returns and greater value, but also to higher profits and sales growth.  
Nevertheless, there is an empirical inconsistency since companies, markets and 
countries persist in not voluntarily adopt good governance practices that would result in 
performance improvements. Sometimes the reason is associated with an inefficient/ 
insufficient adaptation to new practices. In addition, these changes may have 
considerable costs that can chase away the economic agents. But, the main reasons for 
not implementing an effective and sustainable reform of CG are the adverse behaviors 
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of owners and managers at the firm level and the constraints of political economy at the 
level of markets and countries. (Claessens, 2003) 
1.4.Relevance to Thematic Field of Research  
CG is a subfield of the science of Corporate Finance and it is not as recent as that. Since 
Adam Smith’s (1776) publication of An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations that CG is a reality and a science that has much relevance. After that, 
many authors have written about this topic, but recently, it has become even more 
relevant due to some corporate failures and financial crisis.  
A set of unexpected business failures in the late 1980s and early 1990s (e.g. Polly Peck 
and Maxwell Communication Group) were considered a result of poor management 
practices and this resulted in depth discussions on CG in the UK. Afterwards, during the 
wave of financial crisis in 1998, in Russia, Asia and Brazil, the behavior of the 
corporate sector reached entire economies, and weaknesses in CG endangered the well-
being of the economic system. Later, the corporate scandals of the early 2000s, 
including Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and others, conducted to a wave of regulation in 
order to prevent that similar problems would not happen again. As a result, economists, 
the corporate world and policymakers have begun to recognize the potential 
macroeconomic consequences of weak CG systems. (Claessens, 2003) 
 A further reason why CG has become increasingly relevant is appointed by Claessens 
(2003) arguing that the progress done in many areas such as "communications 
technology, detailed information about individual corporations and about their national 
governance frameworks" allows a governance that is increasingly important, but more 
difficult due to an increase in the information available. To conclude, generally a good 
CG is associated with an improvement in the relationship with all stakeholders, leading 
to better social and labor relationships. 
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1.5.Objective of the Research 
This topic is one of the most current themes of Corporate Finance and because of that 
has attracted the attention of many researchers of different areas. Based on a robust 
literature review of CG, firm performance measures and econometric studies in the area, 
the main objective of this study is to compile the theories of the firm and management 
into a single document combined with the development of an econometric model of 
sustainable CG to assess the effects that CG has on the performance of the company. The 
empirical application of the study will be the United Kingdom market, represented by 
FTSE100 index that comprises the 100 most highly capitalized blue chip companies, that 
covers approximately 85% of UK market. 
Unfortunately, there are some problems related with governance research that can also 
affect this research. Bøhren et al. (2004) states that the use of partial approaches due to 
limited availability of data and the absence of rich quality data (in terms of variable 
measures and number of years) can lead into biased or wrong conclusions. Nevertheless, 
currently there is no universal model that could be accepted as that and thereby any 
improvement in this area should be seen as a great development.  
1.6.Questions of the Research 
In summary, the central idea of our study is to investigate the influence of CG variables 
on a company’s performance in the United Kingdom in the period of 2005-2012. The 
main research questions are: 
1. Does CG affect firm performance in United Kingdom listed firms? 
2. Does the size and composition of the board affect a company’s performance? 
3. Does compensation of board members impact on a company’s performance? 
4. Does shareholding concentration systematically influence corporate performance? 
5. Does separation of CEO and Chairman roles relevant for enhance firm performance? 
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6. Does CEO characteristics significant for companies’ performance? 
7. Does existence and acting of key board committees relevant for performance? 
8. Does CG variables relate to different measures of performance in the same direction? 
1.7.Structure of the Research 
The research is structured as follows. It starts with a set of definitions of CG and 
explores its relevance. After that, we discuss the objectives of the study, its contribution 
to the thematic field of research and put forward the relevant questions to be addressed. 
Chapter Two provides an extensive literature review of theories, models and legal 
framework in order to support the conceptual framework for hypothesis formulation. In 
Chapter Three, we specify the data for the variables and the sample description. We 
discuss our econometric model and findings of the research in Chapter Four and the 
research ends by identifying the main conclusions, new contributions, limitations and 
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2. Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
2.1.The Origin and Development of Corporate Governance 
Before focusing on the topic of CG, it is important to understand the origin of the 
corporate science. In that sense, the analysis of the 1937 classic “The Nature of the 
Firm” by Ronald Coase becomes imperative. Coase (1937) asks why do firms exist and 
what determines their appropriate size.  
Coase explained that firms exist because they reduce the transaction costs that emerge 
during production and exchange processes, achieving efficiencies gains that individually 
would not be attained at least as effectively. Concretely, he argues that “the main reason 
why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the 
price (market) mechanism.” After this, Coase turns to the issue of the proper size of the 
firm. To explain this, he employed the law of diminishing returns to management. He 
states that “a firm will tend to expand until the costs of organizing an extra transaction 
within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means 
of an exchange on the open market or the costs of organizing in another firm.” 
Through exploration the price mechanism and the transaction costs associated, the 
author highlighted the value/importance of efficiency of resource allocation regarding 
the existence and size of the firm. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, CG is a process that is continually evolving. Its 
initial focus was in how corporations are directed and controlled and that provides the 
bottom line of this subject. Doubtlessly this concept represents the tenets of Agency 
Theory and because of that many surveys on CG only focus on this theoretical view.  
The first sign of this topic was given by Adam Smith’s (1776) publication: 
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The directors of such joint-stock companies, however, being the managers rather of 
other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should 
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private 
copartnery frequently watch over their own.  
In Smith (1776),  p.54. 
As we may see, already at that time, the conflict of interest was an issue for the firm 
theorists but it was not analyzed so deeply. Two centuries later, in their 1932 classic, 
“The Modern Corporation and Private Property”, Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means 
noted that the separation of ownership from control produces a mechanism where the 
interests of the owner and the manager may, and often do, diverge. This was one of the 
most influential analyses of the development of CG in twentieth century. This modern 
corporation was characterized by dispersed ownership among a large number of 
individuals and decision making was done by professional management. As Desender et 
al. (2010) refers, this led to a “concentration of power in the management side that 
might advance their own interests at the cost of the owners’ interests”. Berle & Means 
(1932) goes even further saying that: “The owners of passive property, by surrendering 
control and responsibility over the active property, have surrendered the right that the 
corporation should be operated in their sole interests.”  
One of the most influential analyses of the Agency Theory is “The Economic Theory of 
Agency: The Principal’s Problem” (Ross, 1973). As stated in Ross (1973), an agency 
relationship appears when, in a particular domain of decision problems, there are two or 
more parties and one of them, the agent, "acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for 
the other", the principal. In general, Pareto-efficiency, which assumes that all 
participants hold perfect information, is not verified in the solution of the principal's 
problem. If principal knew what were the appropriate incentives that would provide the 
TIAGO CRISÓSTOMO                  FIRM PERFORMANCE AND CORPORATE  9 
                                                     GOVERNANCE VARIABLES - UNITED KINGDOM                                      




agent to act in accordance with it, there would not be agency problems, i.e., an optimal 
solution would be reached. 
Looking to the past, is clearly that the modern field of corporate finance has grown up 
around the image of a widely held corporation, as it may be seen in the contributions of 
Jensen & Meckling (1976). They apply the theory to the modern corporation by 
modelling the agency costs of outside equity. As Clarke (2004) states, this new 
definition of the firm, as “a nexus of contracts among individual factors of production” 
contrasts with the classical view of the firm as a single product entity with a 
commitment to the maximization of the profits.  
The main topic of this research was the agency relationship that was defined as: 
A contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person 
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision making authority to the agent. If both parties to the relationship are utility 
maximizers, there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best 
interests of the principal. 
In Jensen & Meckling (1976), p. 5. 
The most significant agency problem refers to the separation of management and 
finance. Based on the previous mentioned agency conflicts and deriving from the theory 
on property rights and finance theory, Jensen & Meckling (1976) developed a theory of 
the ownership structure of the firm. They referred to the “ownership structure” rather to 
the “capital structure” because they want to refer not only to the capital separation 
between debt and equity, but also the division of equity between the fraction held by 
managers “inside equity” and the fraction held by anyone outside the firm “outside 
equity”. Later, Fama & Jensen (1983) continued the subject of separation of ownership 
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and control, founded by the principles of specialization of management and risk bearing, 
and also on an effective common approach to controlling the implied agency problems.  
Nevertheless, some studies questioned the empirical validity of the image of dispersed 
ownership portrayed by Berle & Means. The studies of Eisenberg (1976), Demsetz 
(1983), Shleifer & Vishny (1986) and Morck et al. (1988) have shown that, even among 
the largest American firms, there is a significant concentration of ownership. 
Nevertheless, Eisenhardt (1989) in her assessment and review of Agency Theory 
stresses out that, independently of those studies, the theory offers an important 
understanding of information asymmetries, risk bearing, corporate control and 
incentives in organizations that must always be taken into account.  
The prevalence of agency theory in the governance literature lies in some factors that 
Daily et al. (2003) presented in their working paper. First, the simplicity of the theory, 
that reduces the company to two participants -  managers and shareholders – and the 
interests of each are assumed to be both clear and consistent. Secondly, the notion that 
humans are self-interested and generally averse to sacrifice personal interests. 
The development of CG supported by the Agency Theory arrived at the present day as 
one of the major challenges to be solved by economic agents. How does the relationship 
between managers and owners influences decision making, value creation and value 
distribution and how it can be improved? As Handy (1997) states, the old language of 
property and ownership is decontextualized with the modern world because it no longer 
represents what a company actually is and other visions are required. 
2.2.Corporate Governance Theories 
CG is linked to Agency Theory since its origins and even today plays a central role in 
conceptual framework of this theme. Nevertheless, there are other theoretical 
foundations on which the practice of CG has been, if not always consciously, based. 
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Each one of the theories that will be discussed adds some value to relevant aspects of 
CG but, however, is confined to only that same aspect.  
Stewardship Theory 
One of the most critical visions of the Agency Theory is the Stewardship Theory, whose 
roots are based on psychological and sociological theories. Unlike Agency Theory, 
Stewardship Theory assumes that managers are stewards whose behaviours are aligned 
with the objectives of their principals. Donaldson & Davis (1991)argues that managers 
are conceived as being motivated by “a need to achieve, to gain intrinsic satisfaction 
through successfully performing inherently challenging work, to exercise responsibility 
and authority, and thereby to gain recognition from bosses”. These steward managers 
will behaviour in a collectivist way, by understanding that the individualistic behaviour 
will bring a lower utility than the pursuit of the organizational goals. Later, Davis et al. 
(1997) recognized the steward by a high involvement and with a long term 
commitment, oriented to the company's performance. We may conclude that managers 
are motivated by a desire to achieve and gain intrinsic satisfaction by performing 
challenging tasks and the role of the board of directors is seen as contributing to this 
managerial perspective. 
Resource Dependence Theory and Network Theory 
Until now, the focus of the theories presented, was largely related with the internal 
monitoring dilemmas of CG. However, in practice, the companies are part of a complex 
world that establishes relations between all participants. Theories about external 
pressures as Resource Dependence Theory and Network Theory are concerned with the 
external relationships and securing resources in dynamic environments, instead of just 
trying to understand the behavior of organizations internally. The Resource Dependency 
Theory gives attention to the interdependencies of companies and as Lawrence & 
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Lorsch (1967) argues, successful organizations possess internal structures that match 
environmental demands and inclusively that board’ size and composition are “rational 
organizational responses to the conditions of the external environment”.  Jones et al. 
(1997) defined the network oriented system, where they identify some key aspects such 
as patterns of interaction with informal collaborations within firms, long term 
exchanges that creates inter dependency and flow of resources between independent and 
separate units.  
Stakeholder Theory 
This theory addresses the corporate philosophy in a more extensive sense than the 
Agency Theory by extending the prism of analysis to all participants of the business to 
the world relationship. Freeman & Reed (1983) argues that attention to stakeholders is 
necessary to efficient strategic management in an increasingly complex world wherein 
“multiple groups and individuals affect and is affected by organizational actions”. They 
define organizations as “multilateral agreements between the enterprise and its multiple 
stakeholders”. Employees, managers and owners are classified as internal stakeholders 
and customers, suppliers, special interest groups and the community composes the 
external stakeholders. Blair (1996) argues that the task of the corporate management is 
to “maximize the total wealth created by the company rather than just the value of the 
shareholders stake, then management must take account the effect of decisions on all 
stakeholders in the firm”. 
Upper Echelon’s Theory  
Another theory which focuses on the importance of management and top executives in 
CG is the Upper Echelon’s Theory. Mason & Hambrick (1984) attempt to find the most 
common characteristics of top managers and what the variables that distinguish top 
managers from the others and what is their relevance for the company's behavior. In 
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developing the model, emphasis was on the background characteristics of the top 
managers as opposed to the psychological dimensions. They tested a series of 
propositions such as age, functional track, other career experiences, education, 
socioeconomic roots, financial position, and group characteristics to support the theory. 
After that, Hambrick (2007) discussed the issues of reverse causality (company and 
manager: who attracts whom), endogeneity (natural or induced behaviour), executive 
effects under different national systems and the interactive effects of executive 
characteristics and compensation. 
2.3.Corporate Governance Models  
The various theoretical perspectives presented above lead us to ask which is the best 
system of CG. Although the convergence that seemed to exist for the Anglo Saxon 
system, (Clarke, 2004) after the market crashes and corporate failures mentioned before, 
the confidence and trust in that model cannot be assumed. Superiority of any one system 
of governance cannot be accepted in this way (Clarke & Rama, 2008). The lack of a 
clear taxonomy of systems of CG is one problem when we face this question. The 
study of corporate structures can be divided according to the orientation of the 
system. On the one hand we have the market-oriented system characterized by the 
Anglo-Saxon model. On the other hand, the network-oriented system historically was 
mainly represented by the Germanic model. However, two other variations of this 
system for the Latin model and the Japanese model should be referenced. 
The main difference between models lies on concept of the firm, the board system and 
the ownership structure. As Maassen (1999) refers, the dispersed ownership of outsider 
system of Anglo-Saxon model leads to a separation the ownership from control causing 
that the board is in charge of decision management and decision control. Otherwise, 
the concentrated ownership structure on the “insiders-system” of Germanic and 
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Japanese models leads to an association of ownership with control. The supervisory 
board is in charge of decision control and the management board is responsible by 
decision management. A more extensive and comprehensive analysis is presented by 
Weimer & Pape (1999) with a taxonomy based upon eight characteristics: the 
prevailing concept of the firm, the board system, the salient stakeholders able to exert 
influence on managerial decision-making, the importance of stock markets in the 
national economy, the presence or absence of an external market for corporate control, 
the ownership structure, the extent to which executive compensation is dependent on 
corporate performance, and the time horizon of economic relationships. 
The Anglo-Saxon model, followed by the majority of the companies in US, UK, 
Australia, is shareholder orientated; One-tier board system (executive and 
nonexecutive board); shareholders as salient stakeholder; stock market assumes an 
important role in the national economy; active market for corporate control; dispersed 
ownership; executive compensation is highly performance-dependent and short term 
economic relationships. 
The Germanic model, followed by the majority of the companies in Germany, Sweden, 
Denmark, is institutional orientated; Two-tier board system (executive and supervisory 
board); industrial banks and employees as salient stakeholders; stock market assumes 
an moderate/high  role in the economy; no active market for corporate control; 
moderate/high concentrated ownership; compensation is little performance-dependent 
and long term relationships. 
The Latin model, followed by the majority of the companies in France, Spain, Italy, is 
institutional orientated; Optional board system (in general one-tier); financial holdings, 
government and families as salient stakeholders; stock market assumes a moderate role 
in the national economy; no active market for corporate control; highly concentrated 
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ownership; compensation is moderately performance-dependent and long term 
relationships. 
The Japanese model, followed by the majority of the companies in Japan is 
institutional orientated; Mixed board system (de facto one-tier); city banks and 
employees as salient stakeholders; stock market assumes an important role in the 
national economy; no active market for corporate control; low/moderated ownership 
concentration; executive compensation is little performance-dependent and long term 
economic relationships. 
2.4.Corporate Governance Legal Framework: The United Kingdom Case 
As the wider economic and social significance of CG became apparent, international 
guidelines were published to advance its cause more broadly. These guidelines reflected 
the part which good governance can play in promoting economic growth and business 
integrity (Claessens, 2003). According to Conyon (1994), there was a significant change 
in CG innovations in the UK companies between the end of the 1980s and early 1990s 
consequence of the corporate failures. The Financial Reporting Council (FRC), the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) and accounting professional bodies responded to these 
failures by appointing the Cadbury Committee and this was the beginning of a decade 
of reviews and recommendations that changed all paradigms. The Rutteman Report 
(1994), the Greenbury Report (1995), the Hampel Report (1998), the Turnbull Report 
(1999), the Higgs Report (2003), the Smith Report (2003), the New Combined Code 
(2003), the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) and its last review in 2012 all 
followed the footsteps of Cadbury. This last version asserts that the “comply or explain” 
approach is the trademark of CG in the UK. It has been in operation since the Code’s 
beginnings and is the foundation of the Code’s flexibility. It is strongly supported by 
companies and shareholders and has been widely admired and imitated internationally. 
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As mentioned before, the Cadbury Report (1992) was the response for the corporate 
failures that occurred in UK and for the lack of a clear legal framework for the 
companies. The Committee’s objective was to study the structure and responsibilities of 
the board of directors, to review the effectiveness of audits and to consider the 
relationship between shareholders, directors and auditors. The main changes that have 
been comprehensively adopted by the UK listed companies include a clear division of 
responsibilities between the Chairperson and CEO, strengthen the role of Outside 
(Nonexecutive) Directors and the adoption of key committees such as Audit, 
Remuneration and Nomination Committees. Rayton & Cheng (2004) refers that the 
Cadbury Committee spawned the Rutteman Report. This report was presented in 1994 
and outlines that internal control should be embedded in the CG statement through a 
declaration from directors that they are responsible for the company’s system of internal 
control. Public and shareholder concerns about executive compensation lead to 
Greenbury Report in 1995 that made recommendations about director’s remuneration. 
After that, was made a balance of the compliance with the recommendations suggested 
by various committees leading to the Hampel Report in 1998, which suggested that no 
significant changes would be needed. In that same year, the LSE issued the Combined 
Code on CG that was an aggregation of the work developed by all previous 
Committees. In 1999, the Turnbull Report offers guidance based on the adoption by a 
company's board of a risk-based approach to establishing a sound system of internal 
control and reviewing its effectiveness. Corporate failures in the US in 2001 concerned 
the UK’s authorities and in 2003 the Smith Committee provide guidance for the 
effectiveness of audit committees, and the Higgs Committee reviewed the role and 
effectiveness of nonexecutive directors. The New Combined Code (2003) collected the 
recommendations from the Higgs and Smith Reports and introduces recommendations 
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about board performance evaluation. The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) 
published by the FRC sets out standards of good practice for listed companies on board 
composition, remuneration, shareholder relations, accountability and audit. The revised 
Code issued in 2012 focus on five main areas: Leadership, Effectiveness, 
Accountability, Remuneration and Relations with shareholders. (Appendix I) 
2.5. Hypothesis of the Research 
The literature review conducted forms the basis for a conceptual framework for the 
hypotheses/propositions that will be tested. In order to define the hypothesis we will use 
the CG mechanisms that the literature states as the more efficient and effective variables 
for control the agency costs and the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. 
For bring together the interests of managers and shareholders, theorists propose a wide 
diversity of internal and external CG mechanisms.  
The internal mechanisms are the monitoring of the board of directors and by the equity 
ownership structure, the internal control procedures, the balance of power between 
CEO-Chairman and the performance-based remuneration. The primary external 
mechanisms are the external market for corporate control and the legal system 
obligations. This study will focus on the first. Table III presents the summary of some 
previous studies related to the hypothesis formulated. 
The role of the board in monitoring and disciplining management is outlined in the 
agency framework developed by Fama & Jensen (1983). Prior studies suggests that the 
board characteristics which affect the board’s effectiveness are size and independence 
(John & Senbet (1998), Denis & Mcconnell (2001) and Gillan et al. (2006)).  
The size of the board is often largest than what is needed to operate effectively. 
Larger boards are less effective monitors due to potential free riding, communication 
and coordination breakdowns (Boo & Sharma, 2008). Yermack (1996) concludes that 
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smaller boards lead to higher market values. Dahya et al., (2008) find a positive 
relationship between board size and firm value.  Aggarwal et al., (2007) find no support 
that board size impacts on firm value. Lipton & Lorsch (1992), Bhagat & Black (2001), 
Hermalin & Weisbach (2003), Guest (2009) all find negative relation between board 
size and firm performance measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
H1: The size of the board of directors is negatively related with performance. 
Fama & Jensen (1983) expected that independent directors represent the minority 
shareholder’s best interest since the failure of fulfilling their duties may incur an 
extensive reputation cost. The literature outlined the independent directors as an 
efficient way to reduce agency problems and to improve the quality of governance. 
Further, independent directors are effective monitors because they do not have financial 
interests in the company (Johnstone & Bedard, 2004). Bhagat & Black (1998) and 
Yermack (1996) find that board independence reduce firm value. Dahya et al. (2008) 
find that board independence positively affects firm value although firm value does not 
seem to affect board independence. Hossain et al. (2001) and Aggarwal et al. (2007) 
find positive relation between firm performance and board independence. 
H2: Board independence increases firm performance. 
Another topic related to the board is the CEO tenure. Desender et al. (2010) claim that a 
long term director engagement is associated with greater experience, commitment and 
competence because it provides a director with important knowledge about the firm and 
its business environment. Further, the longer a CEO serves, the more the firm-employee 
dynamic improves (Xueming et al., 2013). Miller (1991) and Hambrick (2007) refer that 
because CEO have more invested in firm, they rather avoid losses instead of pursuing 
gains. Bhagat & Bolton (2008) found that CEO Tenure impacts positively in ROA. 
H3: CEO Tenure impacts positively on firm performance. 
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Regular board meetings allow potential problems to be identified, discussed and 
avoided. However, Vafeas (1999) shows that board meeting frequency (BMF) is 
negatively associated with firm value measured by the market-to-book ratio and states 
that this result is explained by the reactive board activity after a drop of share price. 
Further, Jensen (1993) says that BMF increases when firms are poor performing. 
H4: Board Meetings Frequency is negatively related with firm performance. 
At level of internal control procedures, CG literature agrees that Board Committees 
improve the efficiency of board monitoring by effecting closer scrutiny of management 
activities and decision-making. Regarding this issue, the Audit Committee plays a 
central role. Other committees as Remuneration and Nomination are also common in 
UK. The UK CG Code appeals for the existence of these committees to promote 
reasonable assurance that firms are achieving its objectives related to reliable financial 
reporting and compliance with laws and regulations. 
H5: The existence of the Committees is positively related with firm performance. 
Concerning the mechanism of balance of power, the role of chairman is essential to 
maintain it through strategic decisions and providence of accountability. However, 
when CEO and Chairman are the same person, the concentration of power can be 
negative. When a single individual fulfils both roles (CEO Duality), it will be able to 
control the board, reduce the board’s independence from management and make 
decisions in their own interest (Jensen, 1993). By contrast, Finkelstein & D’Aveni 
(1994) argue that an unified leadership improves firm performance. Yermack (1996) 
find a negative relation between CEO Duality and firm performance measured by 
Tobin’s Q. In UK, since Cadbury (1992), the codes strongly recommends the separation 
of powers between CEO and Chairman.    
H6: CEO Duality is negatively related with firm performance. 
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Another important mechanism that literature refers is related with the remuneration of 
the board. The compensation have great interest from CG perspective because 
represents the degree to which executive compensation aligns top executives’ interests 
with those of their shareholders (Denis & McConnell, 2001). The variable remuneration 
may be in the form of cash or non-cash payments such as stocks, stock options, pension 
schemes or other benefits. Several studies, including Murphy (1985), Lewellen et al. 
(1995), find positive relation between board variable remuneration and stock return and 
sales growth. Yet, the optimal level of variable remuneration should be regulated as 
being part of the compensation package along with the fixed remuneration. 
H7: Variable Remuneration increases the firm performance. (NonLinear Relation)  
The last internal mechanism is related with the monitoring made by shareholders. 
Monitoring by shareholders is classified into two groups: firstly, monitoring by the 
insiders directors; and secondly, by the major outside shareholders (block shareholders). 
Relatively to the first, when directors have significant holdings in a company’s shares, 
their decisions have an impact on their personal wealth. Thus, risk attitudes and agency 
costs are reduced (Morck et al., 1988). They claim that insider ownership might be also 
seen in an entrenchment vision and that will be negative for the firm value. However, 
these effects are dominated by the first, confirming Jensen & Meckling (1976) theory. 
The previous study of Guedri & Hollandts (2008) finds an inverted U-shaped relation of 
CG variables on firm performance, measured by ROE. Bhagat & Black (1998) finds 
that CEO ownership increases Tobin’s Q value. 
H8: Board Ownership has positive effects on firm performance.  
Secondly, as Shleifer & Vishny (1986) suggest if ownership is dispersed (UK case), 
blockholder’s control tends to be weak. As opposed, when ownership is concentrated, 
major shareholders play a central role in monitoring and reducing managerial 
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opportunism. However, every coin has two sides. Large shareholders have the incentive 
to expropriate the interests of minority shareholders while they use the control rights to 
benefit themselves. Ansón & Rodriguez (2001) find negative relation of Shareholder 
Concentration on firm performance measured by PER. Contrary, La Porta et al.(1998), 
Gompers et al. (2003), Desender et al. (2010) conclude that ownership concentration 
increases firm performance measured by Stock Returns and Tobin’s Q. 
H9: Shareholding concentration decreases UK firm’s performance.  
 
 








Hypothesis Expected Sign 
H1: The size of the board of directors is negatively related with performance 
- 
H2: Board independence increases firm performance 
+ 
H3: CEO Tenure impacts positively on firm performance 
+ 
H4: Board Meetings Frequency is negatively related with firm performance 
- 
H5: The existence of the Committees is positively related with firm performance 
+ 
H6: CEO Duality is negatively related with firm performance 
- 
H7: Variable Remuneration increases the firm performance (Nonlinear Relation) 
∩ 
H8: Board Ownership has positive effects on firm performance 
+ 
H9: Shareholding concentration decreases UK firm’s performance 
- 
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3. Methodology and Data 
The methodology used concerning the literature review was a meta-analysis approach. 
Shachar (2008) defines meta-analysis as “a collection of systematic techniques for 
resolving apparent contradictions in research findings. Meta-analysts translate results 
from different studies to a common metric and statistically explore relations between 
study characteristics and findings furnishing more insight and explanatory power.”  
3.1.Sample Description 
As referred earlier, the empirical application of the study will be the United Kingdom 
market, represented by FTSE100 index that measure the performance of the 100 largest 
companies traded in the London Stock Exchange and covers approximately 85% of the 
market capitalisation. Source: (FTSE Group, data as at 31 October 2012). 
The companies from the sample are the 100 constituents of the index at 31 December 
2012. The FTSE100 is a good setting to research our hypotheses because disclosure and 
transparency requirements are more extensive on listed companies. These two 
conditions are very important due to the extensive work that was made for the data 
collecting process. Due to the lack of consistent and reliable database that covers all 
variables of the research, it was necessary to build the entire database. All variables 
information was directly collected from the consolidated annual report of each company 
for the eight years of analysis.  When developing a database of this type is essential to 
take into account the characteristics of the companies that will be included in the 
sample. Thus, financial companies were not considered in the sample. As referred in 
Rajan & Zingales (1995) “We eliminate financial firms, such as banks and insurance 
companies form the sample because their leverage is strongly influenced by explicit (or 
implicit) investor insurance schemes such as deposit insurance. Furthermore, their debt-
like liabilities are not strictly comparable to the debt issued by nonfinancial 
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firms. Finally, regulations such as minimum capital requirements may directly affect 
capital structure.” This last justification is quite important since that are restrictions 
imposed by the Basel Accords, which are the recommendations on banking regulations 
(Minimum Capital Requirements is the first pillar of Basel II). Besides that, in order to 
have a balanced data some companies were excluded from the sample
1
. The final 
sample comprises 70 companies during eight years. 
3.2.Model Variables Description 
The aim of this research is to find if the CG variables affect firm performance and 
realize if this effect impacts in the same direction that theory declares. No single metric 
is perfect and different metrics are appropriate depending upon the circumstances. The 
definition of all variables that were analysed in this research is presented in Table V.  
On the left side of the equation, as dependent variables, we will have the performance 
measures. Since there is no universally accepted indicator of performance, information 
about this measurement was collected on an extensive and varied range of studies. 
Therefore, the measurement of firm performance was divided in two main areas. The 
Financial/Operational Performance that has basis on book values accounts and the 
Market Value measures that are related with market performance of the company. The 
first set was proxy by ROE, ROA, Sales Growth, EBITDA Turnover Ratio and OM. 
The Market measures were represented by Tobin’s Q, Price to Book Ratio, Stock 
Returns and PER. Although we have studied the mentioned variables, only Tobin’s Q 
was considered as main proxy to performance and ROA, OM and ROE for comparative 
analysis. There have been several studies about the effect of CG (of listed firms) on 
performance that have used this to proxy for firm performance (Park & Song, 1995; 
Mørck et al., 1988; McConnell & Servaes, 1990). 
                                                 
1
 Table IV present the composition of final sample. 
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Tobin & Brainard (1968) introduced the variable Q, the ratio between the market value 
and replacement value of the same physical asset, related to their study “Pitfalls in 
Financial Model Building”: 
Q = Market Value of Asset / Replacement Cost of Asset  
Lindenberg & Ross (1981) introduce the Tobin’s Q ratio in their paper which “develops 
such a comparison between accounting data and financial data to examine the extent, 
distribution, and history of monopoly rents and quasi-rents in the industrial sector", by 
using the variable Q proposed by Tobin & Brainard (1968). The Lindenberg and Ross 
(1981) algorithm is seen as the superior Tobin’s Q model but it is complex in nature 
and requires data that are often unavailable in most databases.  
Tobin's Q = (Market Value of Debt + Market Value of Common Stock + Market Value 
of Preferred Stock) / Replacement Cost of Assets 
Morck, Shleifer & Vishny (1988) investigate the relationship between management 
ownership and market valuation of the firm, as measured by Tobin's Q: 
Average Tobin's Q = Firm’s market value / Replacement cost of its physical assets = 
(Actual market value of common stock + Estimated market value of preferred stock + 
Estimated market value of debt) / Replacement cost of the firm’s plant and inventories 
Perfect & Wiles (1994), following Lindenberg and Ross (1981), presents: 
Tobin's Q = Market Value of the Firm / Replacement Value of Assets = (Equity + Debt 
+ Preferred Stocks) / (Plant + Equipment + Inventories) 
In our study, the Tobin’s Q formula adopted is the same that Kaplan & Zingales (1997) 
used due to its simplicity and compatibility with our data: 
(1) Tobin’s Q = 
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On the other side, we will have the independent/explanatory governance variables. As 
Denis & McConnell (2001) refers, the governance mechanisms that have been most 
extensively studied are the Board of Directors and the Equity Ownership Structure of 
the firm. These mechanisms of CG try to reduce agency costs, although, in practice, the 
problem may not be perfectly solved. In order to add some information to this research 
field and explore other mechanisms, this research gives attention to the issues of 
Compensation of Board, CEO Personal Information, Dividends Policy and looks at Key 
Committees of the companies. 
The Board variables considered were Board Size, CEO Duality, Board Independence, 
Percentage of Nonexecutives Directors and Female Board Members. The Ownership 
group variables comprised the Board Ownership, the Type of Largest Ownership, the 
percentage owned by the Largest Shareholder, the percentage owned by the 5 Largest 
Shareholders and the percentage owned by Shareholders with more than 5%. Relatively 
to the Compensation variables, CEO Cash Compensation, Board Fixed Remuneration, 
Board Variable Remuneration, the existence of Pension Schemes and Stock 
Compensation were all considered for the research. Regarding CEO Personal 
Information, the variables were Tenure, Age and Gender. Concerning to Dividends’ 
Policy, the proxy variables considered were the Pay-out Ratio, DPS and the Dividend 
Growth. Finally, for the Key Committees group, the existence of Audit, Remuneration 
and Nomination Committees, ACM and BMF were considered.  
Due to the fact that firms are rather heterogeneous, control variables were required. The 
variables considered were Market Capitalization, Traded Volume, Net Assets, Firm 
Size, Book D/E, Sales, ROS, EBITDA, Big4 Auditor and Industry. Naturally and for 
parsimony reasons not all variables will be included in the model. Still, Table VI 
present the descriptive statistics for all variables listed above. 
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Since we are studying microeconomic data and we want to test the effects that CG has 
on performance, the solution that seems to best fit the data is a Panel Data analysis. 
With panel data we can explore simultaneously variations of variables over time (t) and 
across different individuals (i) by pooling/stacking the sample. 
(2)                        , i = 1,…,N;   t = 1,…,T;         
(3)                   
 
where       is a regressors vector, αi are individual-specific effects,    are time effects,  
and      is an idiosyncratic error.  
This technique allows for a larger number of observations, thus improving the estimator 
properties (F and t tests more meaningful). Due to the fact that we are working with 
sectional data, the heterogeneity among individuals is included in the error term solving 
this specific endogeneity problem. Besides that, it increases efficiency and stability of 
estimators, when applied an adequate estimation methods and hypothesis tests that 
should allow a safe choice among different estimations. The statistical software used 
was STATA that is considered a complete and integrated statistical software package.  
As stated earlier, the main objective of this study is to compile theories of the firm and 
management into a single document combined with the development of an econometric 
model of sustainable CG to assess the effects that CG has on the performance of the 
company. The first part of the study gives the necessary support to develop the 
empirical model. We try to develop a broader model by introducing some variables 
beyond the commonly used related with Board of Directors and the Equity Ownership 
Structure. The objective is to offer greater insight into how CG mechanisms are 
contingent on the performance of the firm. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that the 
model is concise and perfectly sustained by theoretical foundations of CG. The first 
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stage of testing the relationship between CG and firm performance is the OLS 
regression using the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q as dependent variable: 
      (4)     (         )                                       
                                                           
                                            
   (                           )
                    
                                                
Tobin’s Q has been the most common proxy for performance used in CG for listed 
firms (Nanka-Bruce, 2009) . Since that this measure only assumes non-zero or non-
negative values, it has been logarithmic transformed to increase homoskedasticity and 
normality. Besides that, the “Audit Committee” dummy variable was replaced by ACM 
due to colinearity. As all firms in all years of the period have an Audit Committee and 
this lead to drop the variable. The second choice to proxy the internal control was the 
presence of a “Big4 Auditor”, but the problem remains the same. The “Shareholder 
Concentration” will be measured by the sum of all shareholdings above 5% in the 
company (“Shareholder Larger 5%”).  Large firms have economies of scope and scale 
that are supposed to influence performance. “Firm Size” is a main control variable 
because of its risk- neutral effect on corporate ownership and heterogeneity (Demsetz & 
Lehn, 1985). We used as an indicator of firm size the logarithm of assets in accordance 
with Truong&Dunstan (2010) and Erkens et al. (2012). The results of regression (4) are 
presented in Table VII. However, after the specification stage, any econometric analysis 
requires some care regarding the consistency and efficiency of estimations. 
Endogeneity 
This problem occurs when there is a correlation between the regressor(    ) and 
the error term(    ). Almost all models face this problem and frequently correlation 
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between residuals and explanatory variables is related to unobserved heterogeneity (  ), 
which is a form of omitted variables bias and refers to omitted variables that are fixed 
for an individual (at least over a long period of time). Since we are dealing with 
microeconomic data and short panels (8 years), the most probable source of endogeneity 
is the unobserved individual effects(  ). Seeing that the asymptotic property of 
 (    |     )    is not guaranteed, the default OLS estimator and therefore the results of 
(3) are biased and inconsistent. In order to correct this problem there are other 
estimators that can produce consistent estimates and/or more efficient results. Panel 
analysis can be done by pooling the data together and using fixed, between or random 
effects. As Cameron & Trivedi (2009) refers a relevant distinction is between fixed 
effects models (FE), emphasized by microeconometricians, and random effects (RE) 
and mixed models favoured by many others. The FE allows regressors to be 
endogenous provided that they are correlated only with a time-invariant component of 
error (  ). The RE assumes that regressors are completely exogenous, what is difficult 
to achieve with this kind of data. Wooldridge (2002) states that the generally accepted 
way of choosing between fixed and random effects is the Hausman test where the null 
hypothesis is that the preferred model is RE vs. the alternative the FE. Since FE is 
consistent when (  )  and (    ) are correlated, but RE is inconsistent, a statistically 
significant difference is interpreted as evidence against the random effects assumption 
RE. We ran the test and indicate that we should use FE. When using FE, we assume that 
something within the individual characteristics may impact or bias the explanatory 
variables and we need to control for this. The insight for the FE estimator is that if we 
demean observations for the same individual, the heterogeneity term (  ) drops out and 
OLS would be a consistent estimator. (Appendix II).  
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Nevertheless, problems caused by (  ) could still affect our results. In order to get 
stronger results, we introduce a time dummy variable for each year of analysis in an 
attempt to control time effects. 
Panel Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation 
Unfortunately, the endogeneity problem is not the only one that we need to pay 
attention. Heteroskedasticity occurs when the variance of the disturbance is not constant 
(Var(    |     )   
 ). We do not need the homoskedasticity assumption to show that 
OLS is still unbiased. However, this assumption is needed to show the efficiency of 
OLS. Hence, OLS is not BLUE any longer. The variances of the OLS estimators are 
biased and the usual OLS t-statistic and confidence intervals are no longer valid for 
inference problem. According to Greene (2007), in order to test the presence of panel 
heteroskedasticity, we use a  modified Wald statistic for groupwise heteroskedasticity in 
the residuals of a fixed effect regression model. The null hypothesis is homoskedasticity 
(or constant variance). After testing, we reject the null and conclude that 
heteroskedasticity affects the data. Nevertheless, as Baltagi (2008) states, we can still 
use the OLS estimators by finding heteroskedasticity-robust estimators of the variances 
to deal with this problem, which is very simple to compute in STATA. 
The last problem relies on the presence of serial correlation. When error terms from 
different (usually adjacent) time periods are correlated (Corr(    |       )   ), we say 
that the error term is serially correlated. The consequences of serial correlation for the 
estimation are similar to heteroskedasticity, but the problems caused by the latter are 
usually more severe. We test the presence of serial correlation by performing a 
Lagrange Multiplier test (Wooldridge, 2002) where the null hypothesis is no serial 
correlation. We conclude that serial correlation is present on the data.  
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Following Wooldridge (2011), we correct both Panel Heteroskedasticity and Serial 
Correlation problems by “Clustering-Robust” standard errors, which specifies that the 
standard errors allow for intragroup correlation, relaxing the usual requirement that the 
observations be independent (Appendix III). Wooldridge (2011) says that: “if (i) is large 
and (t) is not very large, the "cluster" option after FE is attractive. The other approaches 
assume parametric forms and typically rely on large T approximations”. The resulting 
standard errors are completely robust to any kind of serial correlation and/or 
heteroskedasticity. The results of FE model with Cluster-Robust corrections applied to 
regression (4) are presented on Table II. This final estimator allowed us to take solid 
and defendable conclusions about the regression and gives strength to this survey. 
4.2.Findings of the Research 
The results presented on Table II will allow us to dissipate a little mist that hangs over 
the binomial CG/performance.  
Table II: Regression Analysis: Fixed Effects with Cluster Robust Standard Errors 
Variable Log (Tobin’s Q) 
Board Size 0.00313 
 
(0.0137) 
Board Independence 0.373* 
 
(0.222) 
CEO Tenure 0.018** 
 
(0.00523) 
Board Meetings Frequency -0.01348* 
 
(0.0082) 
Audit Committee Meetings 0.014 
 
(0.0121) 
CEO Duality -0.309*** 
 
(0.06385) 








Board Ownership 1.453*** 
 
(0.3234) 
Shareholders larger 5% -0.486** 
 (0.2096) 
***|**|* = Significant at 1%| 5%| 10% levels. Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
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As we may see, only Board Size and ACM variables are not statistically significant, 
achieving the objective of producing a sustainable econometric model and allowing us 
to answer to the main question of this research - CG variables affects firm performance 
in United Kingdom listed firms in the period of 2005-2012.  
The next finding related to our sample concerns about board control mechanisms. 
Although we had hypothesized that board size affects negatively firm performance, the 
results showed us that board size were not statistically significant for our sample, not 
confirming the hypothesis. In terms of Board Independence, the results confirmed the 
expected positive relationship by saying that, on average, one additional percentage 
point in the ratio of independent board members, will corresponds approximately to an 
increase in firm performance, measured by Tobin’s Q, of 0,373%, ceteris paribus. 
Regarding the CEO Tenure, the experience and knowledge prevails over excessive 
defensible attitude, by stating that, on average, one additional year of experience will 
corresponds approximately to an increase in firm performance of 1,8%, ceteris paribus, 
thus confirming the hypothesis. Finally, BMF effects negatively firm performance, 
possibly confirming that boards are reactive and not proactive. On average, one 
additional board meeting will correspond approximately to an decrease in firm 
performance measured by Tobin’s Q of 1,35%, ceteris paribus.  
Concerning Internal Controls, the proxy ACM was not statistically significant, not 
confirming the expected positive relation that is referred by substantial part of the 
literature.  
Another issue, concerning CG is the CEO Duality. As stated before, the several 
guidance codes recommend separating the two roles. The results strengthen this idea by 
stating that firms with separated roles will have better performance comparatively with 
firms where CEO and Chairman are the same person.  
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Concerning Board Variable Remuneration, as the negative sign of the quadratic 
coefficient induces, there is a limit level of variable remuneration that maximizes the 
firm performance. Above this limit, the company has no advantage in increasing the 
variable remuneration. The limit for our sample is 19.4318 million of € for the board as 
a whole.  
The widely studied topic of equity ownership structure confirmed the hypothesis: Board 
ownership is an effective control that produces significant statistical positive results for 
firm performance. On average, one additional percentage point in the ratio of board 
ownership, will corresponds approximately to an increase in firm performance, 
measured by Tobin’s Q, of 1,45%, ceteris paribus. Lastly, Shareholder Concentration 
proves that in an environment of dispersed ownership, concentration has negative effect 
on firm performance. The results stated that, on average, one additional percentage 
point in the ratio of shareholder concentration, will corresponds approximately to a 
decrease in firm performance, measured by Tobin’s Q, of 0,49%, ceteris paribus.  
In order to test if CG variables relate to different measures of performance in the same 
direction, the Table VIII provides analysis on indicators as ROA, OM and ROE. Board 
Size continues to have no statistically significant results with the measures of 
performance analysed. Board Independence and CEO Tenure are only statistically 
significant with Tobin’s Q. BMF is statistically negative significant with Tobin’s Q, 
ROA and OM. ACM has no significant relationship with the measures of firm 
performance analysed. CEO Duality has negative significant results with Tobin’s Q and 
ROA. Board Variable Remuneration is the most significant variable amongst the 
analysed governance variables, except with ROE. Board Ownership has significant 
positive relationship with the analysed performance measures, except with ROE. 
Finally, Shareholder Concentration is only negatively significant with Tobin’s Q.  
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5. Conclusions, Contribution, Limitations and Future Research 
The primary contribution to the literature is the consistent estimation of the relationship 
between CG and firm performance, by taking into account the inter-relationships among 
CG variables and measures of firm performance. As Rayton & Cheng (2004) confirms, 
the role, nature and development of UK CG system have been the subject of a great deal 
attention from practitioners, authorities and academics. We research this issue in detail 
by testing the specific mechanisms through which CG may influence firm performance. 
One of the contributions of this study relies on the fact that, unlike most existing 
research, which usually studies just one set of mechanisms, we focus on several 
mechanisms of CG: monitoring of board of directors and by the equity ownership 
structure, the internal control procedures, the balance of power between CEO-Chairman 
and the performance-based remuneration. With this analysis it is possible to have a 
broader view on the major relevance that CG has in today's globalized world. It was 
noticed that these mechanisms not only impacts on firm performance but also are 
responsible for maintaining the economic equilibrium at micro and macro levels, 
preventing the occurrence of crises and corporate failures that can affect the entire 
world. The results complement the existing research conducted in the context of 
dispersed firms and, in addition, provide a new added value of analysing the overall 
effect that the various mechanisms of CG have on firm performance. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q gives significant statistical 
results in relation with mechanisms of CG. Overall, the reliable and robust results 
indicate Board Variable Remuneration, Board Ownership and CEO Duality as the most 
significant CG mechanisms for explaining firm performance. Nevertheless, depending 
on the performance measure used, we may expect different results and because of that 
ROA, OM and ROE were tested. ROA and OM have also significant results for the 
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variables mentioned before. Contrary and confirming the evidence of previous studies, 
ROE is not statistically significant with any CG variables. Yet, due to the fact that ROE 
is a relevant indicator to enterprise management has been included in this analysis. The 
above findings have important implications for researchers, policy makers, and 
corporate boards: Efforts to improve CG should focus on the increase of independent 
directors on the board, stock ownership of board members as disciplinary management 
mechanism and suitable levels of performance based remuneration - since they are not 
simply positively related to firm performance, but also with economic development and 
well-being. In this framework, the finance model, in which the central concern of CG is, 
based on agency theory, how to design rules and incentives to align the behaviour of 
managers with the interests of owners, needs to be supported with other templates of 
corporate control including stewardship, stakeholder models applying not only financial 
analysis but a cultural and power analysis among other perspectives. 
Limitations of the current study are also acknowledged and are related with data 
availability. For example, companies that are not listed in all years of the period may 
offer, to some extent, inaccurate results due to the lack of market data. Another 
limitation is the absence of non-listed companies that present very distinct characteristics 
from the listed companies and surely will present different results. 
Future researches may extend our findings with other governance variables and also 
research the effects of external mechanisms. If possible, should develop a balanced 
model of firm performance-CG using both mechanisms and expanding the analysis to 
other UK’s indexes in order to get a more significant sample. 
The conclusions of the present research are applicable to the UK market. Nevertheless, 
it is relevant to emphasize that a sound CG system should not consist in a tick boxing 
exercise but instead in a proper cultural mind set and changes in prevailing status quo. 
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Appendix I: Chronological Development of Codes and Guidance and an Adaptation 
of The UK Corporate Governance Code 2012 
 
This appendix describes the chronological development of the UK Corporate 
Governance system in some detail. An understanding of the timing of the various 
recommendations described below is important when discussing the pattern of adoption 
observed in UK companies. After that, is presented an adaptation of the most recent 














An Adaptation of:  
Financial Reporting Council, September 2012 
The UK Corporate Governance Code 2012 - Main Principles 
The new Code applies to accounting periods beginning on or after 1 October 2012 and 
applies to all companies with a Premium listing of equity shares regardless of whether 
they are incorporated in the UK or elsewhere. The UK Stewardship Code, which 
provides guidance on good practice for investors, should be seen as a companion piece 
to this Code. The “comply or explain” approach is the trademark of CG in the UK. It 
has been in operation since the Code’s beginnings and is the foundation of the Code’s 
 Source: Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), Author’s elaboration. 
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flexibility. It is strongly supported by both companies and shareholders and has been 
widely admired and imitated internationally. The main principles of the Code are 
Leadership, Effectiveness, Accountability, Remuneration and Relation with 
Shareholders. 
Concerning to Leadership, the code recommend that The Role of the Board  is to 
provide  that every company should be headed by an effective board which is 
collectively responsible for the long-term success of the company, the Division of 
Responsibilities which states that there should be a clear division of responsibilities at 
the head of the company between the running of the board and the executive 
responsibility for the running of the company’s business and no one individual should 
have unfettered powers of decision, The Chairman who is responsible for leadership of 
the board and ensuring its effectiveness on all aspects of its role, and Non-executive 
Directors that as part of their role as members of a unitary board, should constructively 
challenge and help develop proposals on strategy. 
With respect to Effectiveness, The Composition of the Board  and its committees 
should have the appropriate balance of skills, experience, independence and knowledge 
of the company to enable them to discharge their respective duties and responsibilities 
effectively, Appointments to the Board should be a formal, rigorous and transparent 
procedure for the appointment of new directors, Commitment of all directors to be able 
to allocate sufficient time to the company to discharge their responsibilities effectively, 
Development so that all directors receive induction on joining the board and should 
regularly update and refresh their skills and knowledge, Information and Support so that 
the board is supplied in a timely manner with information in a form and of a quality 
appropriate to enable it to discharge its duties, Evaluation of the Board in order to 
undertake a formal and rigorous annual evaluation of its own performance and that of its 
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committees and individual directors, and  Re-election advises that all directors should be 
submitted for re-election at regular intervals, subject to satisfactory performance. 
Relatively to Accountability, the sub principle of Financial and Business Reporting 
advises that the Board should present a fair, balanced and understandable assessment of 
the company’s position and prospects, Risk Management and Internal Control states 
that the board is responsible for determining the nature and extent of the significant 
risks it is willing to take in achieving its strategic objectives and should maintain sound 
risk management and internal control systems, Audit Committee and Auditor regards 
that should be established formal and transparent arrangements for considering how the 
board should apply the corporate reporting and risk management and internal control 
principles and for maintaining an appropriate relationship with the company’s auditors. 
In relation to Remuneration, The Level and Components of Remuneration should be 
sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors of the quality required to run the 
company successfully, but a company should avoid paying more than is necessary for 
this purpose. A significant proportion of executive directors’ remuneration should be 
structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual performance. Procedure 
counsel that should be formal and transparent for developing policy on executive 
remuneration and for fixing the remuneration packages of individual directors. No 
director should be involved in deciding his or her own remuneration. 
Regarding Relations with shareholders, the sub principle Dialogue with Shareholders 
recommends that should be a dialogue based on the mutual understanding of objectives. 
The board as a whole has responsibility for ensuring that a satisfactory dialogue with 
shareholders takes place. Constructive Use of the AGM advises that the board should 
use the AGM to communicate with investors and to encourage their participation. 
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Appendix II: Fixed Effects Model with Within Estimator 
 
(1)                         ,i = 1,…,N;   t = 1,…,T;         
(2)                    
 
In the fixed effects model, the    in (1) are permitted to be correlated with the 
regressors     . This allows for a limited form of endogeneity. We view the error in (1) 
as (2) and permit       to be correlated with the time-invariant component of the error 
  , while continuing to assume      is uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error     .   
The FE model implies that E(        ,     ) =          , assuming E(        ,     ) = 0, 
so   =   (             )       . The attraction of the FE model is that we can obtain a 
consistent estimate of the marginal effect of the jth regressor on E(       ,     ), 
provided       is time varying, even if the regressors are endogenous.  
Estimators of the parameters   of the FE model (1) must remove the fixed effects   . 
That can be achieved with the Within estimator. The Within transformation does so by 
mean differencing. The fixed effects    in the model (1) can be eliminated by subtraction 
of the corresponding model for individual means   ̅ =   ̅    +   ̅, leading to the within 
model or mean differenced model:  (        ̅) = (     -   ̅)   + (       ̅), where, for 
example,   ̅ =   
  ∑     
  
   . The Within estimator is the OLS estimator of this model. 
Because    has been eliminated, OLS leads to consistent estimates of   even if    is 
correlated with     , as is this case in the FE model. This result is a great advantage of 
panel data. Consistent estimation is possible even with endogenous regressors     , 
provided that      is correlated only with the time-invariant component of the error,   , 
and not with the idiosyncratic error,     .  
Cameron & Trivedi, 2009 
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Appendix III: Cluster Robust Standard Errors   
 
When errors for different observations are correlated, the Gauss Markov assumption, 
Cov(  |  )           is violated. The default estimates of the Variance-Covariance 
Estimator (VCE) are invalid. For time-series, this is the case if errors are serially 
correlated. For cross section this can arise when errors are clustered. Clustered or 
grouped errors are errors that are correlated within a cluster or group and 
uncorrelated across clusters. In panel data we assume independence over individuals 
but with correlation over time for a given individual. A cluster robust estimator of the 
VCE of the OLS estimator is 
 ̂       ( ̂)  (   )
   (
 
   
   
   
 ∑  
 
  ̂   ̂     ) ( 
  )   
where   = 1,…, G denotes the cluster (such as company),  ̂  is the vector of residuals 
for the observation in the  th cluster, and    is a matrix of the regressors for the 
observation in the  th cluster. The key assumptions made are error independence 
across clusters and that the number of clusters G→∞. The estimate of the VCE is in fact 
heteroskedasticity-robust and cluster robust, because there is no restriction on 
Cov(       )  
Cameron & Trivedi, 2009 
  
As Wooldridge (2002) and Baltagi (2008) says “if there is serial correlation in the 
idiosyncratic error term, clustering at the panel level will produce consistent estimates 
of the standard errors.” To sum up, using cluster achieves the following: the estimates 
are the same, but the standard-errors (and t-tests and f-tests) are consistent even if 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of any type are present. 
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Table III: The effect of corporate governance variables on firm performance: Summary of previous studies  
OLS stands for Ordinary Least Squares regression models, FE stands for Fixed Effects Model, IV stands for Instrumental Variable Models, GMM stands for Generalized Method of Moments Models and 
MRA stands for Multivariate Regression Analysis
Independent Variable Dependent Variable Positive Expected Relation 
Inverted U-Shaped Expected 
Relation (∩) 
Negative Expected Relation Insignificant Results Econometric model 
  Adams & Mehran (2005)    OLS / FE 
 Tobin’s Q Dahya et al. (2008)    MRA 
    Bhagat & Black (2001)  OLS/2SLS 
    Guest (2009)  OLS/FE/GMM 
  Coles et al. (2008)    OLS/3SLS 
Board Size    Eisenberg et al. (1998)  ML 
 ROA    Bhagat & Black (2001)  OLS/2SLS 
    Yermack (1996)  OLS / FE 
    Hermalin & Weisbach (2003)  OLS / FE 
   Bhagat & Black (2001)  Bhagat & Black (2002) OLS 
    Bhagat & Black (1998)  OLS 
    Agrawal & Knoeber (1996)  2SLS 
 Tobin’s Q Dahya et al. (2008)    MRA 
Board Independence    Yermack (1996)   OLS / FE 
  Hossain  et  al.  (2001)    OLS 
  Aggarwal et al. (2007    OLS / IV 
 ROA Bhagat & Bolton (2009)    OLS/2SLS/3SLS 
 Operating Margin    Bhagat & Black (1998) OLS 
CEO Tenure ROA Bhagat & Bolton (2008)    OLS/2SLS/3SLS 
BMF  P/B Ratio   Vafeas (1999)  OLS 
Committees Stock Return Desender (2010)    OLS 
CEO Duality Tobin's Q   Yermack (1996)  OLS / FE 
Variable Remuneration 
Stock Return 
Murphy(1985)    OLS 
Lewellen et al. (1995)    OLS 
Sales Growth 
Murphy(1985)    OLS 
Lewellen et al. (1995)    OLS 
 ROE  Guedri & Hollandts (2008)   OLS / RE 
Board Ownership P/B Ratio  Guedri & Hollandts (2008)   OLS / RE 




Gompers et al. (2003)    OLS 
La Porta et al. (1998)    OLS 
Stock Return Desender (2010)    OLS 
PER Ratio   Ansón & Rodríguez (2001)  OLS 
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Table IV: List of Constituents of FTSE100 at 31 Dec 2012 
 
 
Constituent name ICB Sector Code ICB Sector Description 
BG Group 0530 Oil & Gas Producers 
BP 0530 Oil & Gas Producers 
Royal Dutch Shell 0530 Oil & Gas Producers 
Tullow Oil 0530 Oil & Gas Producers 
Amec 0570 Oil Equipment Services & Distribution 
Petrofac 0570 Oil Equipment Services & Distribution 
Wood Group (John)* 0570 Oil Equipment Services & Distribution 
Croda International 1350 Chemicals 
Johnson Matthey 1350 Chemicals 
Evraz 1750 Industrial Metals & Mining 
Anglo American 1770 Mining 
Antofagasta 1770 Mining 
BHP Billiton 1770 Mining 
Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation* 1770 Mining 
Fresnillo* 1770 Mining 
Glencore International* 1770 Mining 
Kazakhmys 1770 Mining 
Polymetal International* 1770 Mining 
Randgold Resources 1770 Mining 
Rio Tinto 1770 Mining 
Vedanta Resources 1770 Mining 
Xstrata 1770 Mining 
CRH 2350 Construction & Materials 
BAE Systems 2710 Aerospace & Defense 
Meggitt 2710 Aerospace & Defense 
Rolls-Royce Holdings 2710 Aerospace & Defense 
Rexam 2720 General Industrials 
Smiths Group 2720 General Industrials 
IMI 2750 Industrial Engineering 
Melrose 2750 Industrial Engineering 
Weir Group 2750 Industrial Engineering 
Aggreko 2790 Support Services 
Babcock International Group 2790 Support Services 
Bunzl 2790 Support Services 
Capita 2790 Support Services 
Experian* 2790 Support Services 
G4S 2790 Support Services 
Intertek Group 2790 Support Services 
Serco Group 2790 Support Services 
Wolseley 2790 Support Services 
GKN 3350 Automobiles & Parts 
Diageo* 3530 Beverages 
SABMiller 3530 Beverages 
Associated British Foods 3570 Food Producers 
Tate & Lyle 3570 Food Producers 
Unilever 3570 Food Producers 
Reckitt Benckiser Group 3720 Household Goods & Home Construction 
Burberry Group 3760 Personal Goods 
British American Tobacco 3780 Tobacco 
Imperial Tobacco Group 3780 Tobacco 
Smith & Nephew 4530 Health Care Equipment & Services 
AstraZeneca 4570 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 
GlaxoSmithKline 
Shire 






Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 
Food & Drug Retailers 
Food & Drug Retailers 
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Constituent name ICB Sector Code ICB Sector Description 
Tesco 5330 Food & Drug Retailers 
Kingfisher 5370 General Retailers 
Marks & Spencer Group 5370 General Retailers 
Next 5370 General Retailers 
British Sky Broadcasting Group 5550 Media 
ITV 5550 Media 
Pearson 5550 Media 
Reed Elsevier 5550 Media 
WPP 5550 Media 
Carnival* 5750 Travel & Leisure 
Compass Group* 5750 Travel & Leisure 
InterContinental Hotels Group 5750 Travel & Leisure 
International Consolidated Airlines Group* 5750 Travel & Leisure 
Whitbread 5750 Travel & Leisure 
BT Group 6530 Fixed Line Telecommunications 
Vodafone Group 6570 Mobile Telecommunications 
SSE 7530 Electricity 
Centrica 7570 Gas Water & Multiutilities 
National Grid 7570 Gas Water & Multiutilities 
Pennon Group 7570 Gas Water & Multiutilities 
Severn Trent 7570 Gas Water & Multiutilities 
United Utilities Group 7570 Gas Water & Multiutilities 
Barclays 8350 Banks 
HSBC Hldgs 8350 Banks 
Lloyds Banking Group 8350 Banks 
Royal Bank Of Scotland Group 8350 Banks 
Standard Chartered 8350 Banks 
Admiral Group 8530 Nonlife Insurance 
RSA Insurance Group 8530 Nonlife Insurance 
Aviva 8570 Life Insurance/Assurance 
Legal & General Group 8570 Life Insurance/Assurance 
Old Mutual 8570 Life Insurance/Assurance 
Prudential 8570 Life Insurance/Assurance 
Resolution 8570 Life Insurance/Assurance 
Standard Life 8570 Life Insurance/Assurance 
British Land Co 8670 Real Estate Investment Trusts 
Capital Shopping Centres Group* 8670 Real Estate Investment Trusts 
Hammerson 8670 Real Estate Investment Trusts 
Land Securities Group 8670 Real Estate Investment Trusts 
Aberdeen Asset Management 8770 Financial Services 
Hargreaves Lansdown 8770 Financial Services 
Schroders 8770 Financial Services 
Sage Group 9530 Software & Computer Services 










                                                 
* 
Capital Shopping Centers Group, Experian, Fresnillo and International Consolidated Airlines Group were mergered during the 
period and because of that can not be used for analysis. Additionally, five other companies (Compass, Diageo, ENRC, Glencore 
International, Wood Group (John)) were not considered in the database because some Annual Reports were not available. Finally, 
Carnival and Polymetal International were not considered because information was not sufficient for the survey. 
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Table V: Definition of the Variables 
 
Variable name Description Authors 
 
ROE 
Return on Equity (ROE) =  Net Income (t)/ Book Value 
of Equity (t -1) 




Return on Assets (ROA) = (Operating Income after 
Depreciation)/ (Year-End Total Assets) 
Core & Rusticus (2006) 
Barber & Lyon (1997) 
Bhagat & Bolton (2008, 2009) 
Sales Growth 
Sales growth = (Sales at time (t) – Sales at time (t-1)) / 
Sales at Time (t-1) 
Kentaro & Cusumano (1997) 
EBITDA Turnover EBITDA to Turnover Ratio = EBITDA/ Sales Zhang et al. (2007) 





Log( Tobin’s Q) 
 
Log( Tobin' s Q) = (Market value of assets)/(Book 
value of assets)=  (Book value of assets + Market value 
of common equity-Book value of common equity- 
Deferred taxes) /(Book value of assets) 
Tobin & Brainard (1968) 
Lindenberg & Ross (1981) 
Morck & Vishny (1988) 
Kaplan & Zingales (1997) 
Gompers et al. (2003) 
Bhagat & Bolton (2008) 
Demsetz & Lehn (1985) 
Tobin (1969) 
 
Price to Book Ratio 
 
P/B = (Market Value of Equity/Book value of Equity) 
Jensen et al. (1993) 




Total Stock Return = ((P1-P0)+D)/P0 
 
P0 = Initial Stock Price(t-1) 
P1 = Ending Stock Price (t) 
D= Dividends (t) 
 
Gompers et al. (2003) 
Core & Rusticus (2006) 






PER= Stock price / Earnings per share 
Villiers (1995) 












Equals 1 if CEO and Chairman are the same person, 
and 0 otherwise 
Donaldson & Davis (1991) 
Jensen (1993) 
Yermack (1996) 
Bhagat & Bolton (2008, 2009) 
Non-Executive 
Directors 
Non-Executive Directors = Number of Non-Executive 
Board Members/ Total Number of Board Members 
Cadbury Report (1992) 
Pettigrew & McNulty (1998) 
Higgs et al. (2003) 
Board Independence 
Board Independence= (Number of  independent 
directors)/ (Total number of board members) 
Bhagat & Black (1998) 
Hermalin & Weisbach (2001) 
Bhagat & Bolton (2008, 2009) 
Female Board 
Members 
Equals 1 if a firm has a female director, and 0 otherwise 
 
Carter et al. (2003) 
Adams & Ferreira (2009) 
Shrader. et al. (1997) 
 
 




Percentage of Female Board Members = Number of 
Female Board Members / Total Board Members 
Gregory & Kleiner (1991) 
Katzenbach et al. (1995) 






Total amount of Cash compensation of the CEO, in €. 
Jensen & Murphy (1990) 




Total fixed Remuneration of all board members, in 
millions of €. 
Murphy (1985) 
Lewellen et al. (1995) 
Board Variable 
Remuneration 
Total Variable Remuneration of all board members, in 
millions of €. 
Murphy (1985) 





(Total Variable Remuneration of all board members)2, 
in millions of €. 
Murphy (1985) 
Lewellen et al. (1995) 
Pension Schemes 
Equals 1 if the company has pension schemes for its 




Equals 1 if the company has stock based compensation 
for its executives, and 0 otherwise 
Core & Rusticus (2006) 
Murphy (1985) 
Board Ownership 
Board Ownership = Stock held by board members/ 
Total stock of firm 
Morck et al.(1988) 
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Variable name Description Authors 
Largest Shareholder 
Shareholder Concentration = Stock held by the largest 
shareholder / Total stock of firm 
Guedri & Hollandts (2008) 
Shareholder larger 
than 5% 
Shareholder Concentration = Stock held by 
shareholders with at least 5% of firm's stock / Total 
stock of firm 
Guedri & Hollandts (2008) 
5 largest Shareholders 
Shareholder Concentration = Stock held by 5 largest 
shareholders / Total stock of firm 






Largest Shareholder Ownership (ownership is measured 
by cash-flow rights held by the largest shareholder): 
1 - Widely Held; 2 - Family; 3 - State; 4 - Non 
Financial Institution; 5 - Financial Institution; 6 - Cross-
holding; 7 - Miscellaneous. 
Note: 
1: if no shareholder owns more than 10% of shares; 
2-6: if the shareholder is the largest shareholder and 





La Porta et al (1998) 






The number of years a CEO has been elected in that 
company 




Hambrick & Fukutomi (1991) 
CEO Age The number of years (of life) of the CEO. 
Hambrick & Mason (1984) 
Bhagat & Bolton (2008) 
 
CEO Gender 
Equals 1 if CEO is a female, and 0 otherwise 
Strelcova (2004) 
Adams et al. (2007) 
Hausmann et al. (2012) 
Pay-out Ratio 
Pay-out Ratio = Dividends/Corporate profit after-tax 
(Net Income for the same year) 
Lazonick & Sullivan (1993) 
Miller & Modigliani (1961). 
DPS 
DPS= Total Dividends/Shares outstanding for the 
period 
Boldin and Legget (1995) 
 
EPS 
EPS = (Net income- Dividends on Preferred Stock - 
Minority Interests)/Average Outstanding Shares 
Ohlson & Jeuttner-Nauhrot (2000, 2005) 
Bensa et al. (2003) 




Equals 1 if Audit Committee exists, and 0 otherwise 
Fama & Jensen, (1983) 






Equals 1 if Remuneration Committee exists, and 0 
otherwise 
Fama & Jensen, (1983) 
Conyon (1994) 





Equals 1 if Nomination Committee exists, and 0 
otherwise 
Fama & Jensen (1983) 




Number of meetings with the entire board per year 




Number of audit committee meetings held during the 
year 
Truong & Dunstan (2010) 
Abbott et al. (2004) 
Stuart (2009) 
Market Capitalization 
Market Capitalization = Number of shares outstanding 
* Current price of the shares, in millions of €. 
Sorensen et al. (2002) 
Traded Volume Traded Volume = Average of annual daily trading’s Kim & Verrecchia (1994) 
Net Assets 
Net Assets = Total Assets - Total Liabilities, in millions 
of €. 
Lang et al. (1995) 
 
Firm Size 
Log (Total Assets) = The natural logarithm of the total 
assets at the end of the current financial year. 
Truong & Dunstan (2010) 
Erkens et al. (2012) 
Book D/E Book D/E = Debt book value / Equity book value Hovakimian et al. (2001) 
Sales Sales, in millions of €. 
 
Murphy et al.(1985) 
Return on Sales ROS = Net Income (Before Interest and Tax) / Sales Hambrick & Mason (1984) 
 
EBITDA 
EBITDA = Operational Result + Interest + Taxes + 
Depreciations + Amortizations, in millions of €. 
 





Sector in which the company operates. ICB sector 
classification 
0- Oil & Gas;  1- Basic materials;  2- Industrials; 
3- Consumer Goods; 4- Health care;  5- Consumer 
services;  6- Telecommunications;  7- Utilities; 




Erkens et al. (2012) 
 
Big 4 Auditor 
Equals 1 if the company is audited by a Big 4, and 0 
otherwise 
Khurana et al. (2004) 
Jordan et al. (2010) 
 
Economic Period 
Equals 1 if the Economic Period is after 01/Jan./2009, 
and 0 if is before 31/Dec./2008 
 
Erkens et al. (2012) 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Book Performance      
ROE 556 0,7235 8,8929 -2,2392 209,4247 
ROA 560 0,1121 0,0856 -0,8142 0,5517 
Sales Growth 559 0,1087 0,2542 -0,8782 1,4021 
EBITDA Turnover Ratio 560 0,2153 0,1540 -0,3196 0,8209 
Operating Margin 560 0,1519 0,1369 -1,3046 0,7570 
Market Performance      
Log (Tobin’s  Q) 551 0,5294 0,4367 -0,7071 2,0139 
Price to Book Ratio 551 8,7289 102,1264 -153,9215 2.379 
Stock Returns 544 0,2023 0,4982 -0,8592 5,1658 
PER 520 22,5562 39,2770 0,8413 685,8579 
      
Board      
Board Size 560 10,8214 2,6677 6 21 
CEO Duality 560 0,0304 0,1717   
% Non-Executive Directors 560 0,6660 0,1202 0,3333 0,9286 
Board Independence 560 0,5930 0,1241 0 0,9286 
Female Board Members 560 0,7500 0,4334   
% Female Board Members 560 0,1209 0,0995 0 0,5000 
Compensation 
     
CEO Cash Compensation 560 1.002.759 451.887 31.496 4.318.098 
Board Fixed Remuneration 560 3,8545 1,8094 0,8668 13,0100 
Board Variable Remuneration 560 5,0191 5,4190 0 43,5158 
(Board Variable Remuneration)2 560 54,5037 154,2287 0 1893,628 
Pension Schemes 560 0,9482 0,2218   
Stock Compensation 560 0,9571 0,2027   
Ownership 
     
Board Ownership 556 0,0258 0,0972 0 0,6656 
Directors Ownership 547 23.067.134 1.079.631 6.061 1.208.415.646 
Largest Shareholder 558 0,1481 0,1512 0,0326 0,8961 
Shareholder larger 5% 504 0,2287 0,1784 0,0500 1 
5 Largest Shareholders 558 0,2918 0,1727 0,0355 1 
Type of Largest Ownership 560     
CEO Personal Information 
     
CEO Tenure 560 4,9982 4,7535 0 27 
CEO Age 560 52,5429 5,7111 32 68 
CEO Gender 560 0,0429 0,2027   
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dividend’s Policy      
Pay-out Ratio 560 0,4440 1,1715 -12,7467 10,3456 
DPS 560 0,3886 0,5078 0 6,1137 
EPS 560 0,8986 1,3174 -6,4556 12,3361 
Dividend Growth 542 0,1419 0,4549 -1 4,4982 
Key Committees 
     
Audit Committee 560 1 0   
Remuneration Committee 560 0,9857 0,1188   
Nomination Committee 560 0,9821 0,1326   
Board Meetings Frequency 559 8,4741 2,4161 3 25 
Audit Committee Meetings 559 4,8301 1,9788 2 15 
      
Control  
     
Market Capitalization 560 18 898,9503 28032,2243 241,8781 186585,5953 
Traded Volume 545 10.130.186 28.749.250 51,3680 379.693.573 
Net Assets 560 9145,5678 19532,7051 -3050,8278 143949,5225 
Firm Size 560 9,9458 0,5915 8,5898 11,4363 
Book DE 560 8,3529 131,9471 -72,3906 3.117 
Sales 560 19.834.759.269 44.311.880.295 128.424.176 363.375.067.625 
ROS 560 0,1520 0,1369 -1,3046 0,7570 
EBITDA 560 3468,997 7201,2042 -13687,4365 54301,7235 
Industry 560     
Big4 Auditor 560 1 0   
Time 560     
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Table VII: Regression Analysis: Ordinary Least Squares Estimator 
 
 
***|**|* = Significant at 1%| 5%| 10% levels. Standard Errors are in parentheses.  
 
This table reports results from estimating equation (3), the performance equation, with 
OLS estimator. The control variable “Firm Size” is not reported. The “Time” dummy 
control variable is not included in this regression. It studies the effect of CG Variables 
(Internal Mechanisms of Corporate Control) on Firm Performance measured by Log 








 Variable Log (Tobin’s Q)  
    
Board Size 0.0243** 
 
(0.00955) 
Board Independence 0.324** 
 
(0.153) 
CEO Tenure 0.0125*** 
 
(0.00379) 
Board Meetings Frequency -0.0318*** 
 
(0.00729) 
Audit Committee Meetings 0.0261** 
 
(0.0103) 
CEO Duality -0.0779 
 
(0.109) 
Board Variable Remuneration 0.0345*** 
 
(0.00778) 
(Board Variable Remuneration)2 -0.000988*** 
 
(0.000258) 
Board Ownership -0.255 
 
(0.195) 









Adj R-squared 0.3533 
F( 11, 481) 25.43 
Prob > F 0.0000 
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Table VIII: Comparative Regression Analysis: Fixed Effects with Cluster Robust 
Standard Errors 
 
Variable Log (Tobin’s Q) ROA OM ROE 
          
Board Size 0.00313 -0.00269 -0.00671 -0.5078 
 
(0.0137) (0.00412) (0.00578) (0.4658) 
Board Independence 0.373* 0.02713 0.0224 6.45 
 
(0.222) (0.05959) (0.0931) (7.6159) 
CEO Tenure 0.018** 0.00146 0.00093 0.0977 
 
(0.00523) (0.00103) (0.0013) (0.09605) 
Board Meetings Frequency -0.01348* -0.0058*** -0.00666*** -0.1265 
 
(0.00822) (0.00153) (0.00198) (0.1067) 
Audit Committee Meetings 0.014 -0.003013 -0.00306 0.8847 
 
(0.0121) (0.00271) (0.00429) (0.0944) 
CEO Duality -0.309*** -0.1697* -0.23756 0.0875 
 
(0.06385) (0.09088) (0.1564) (1.2255) 
Board Variable Remuneration 0.0171*** 0.00444*** 0.0096*** -0.1988 
 
(0.00612) (0.00134) (0.00297) (0.198) 
(Board Variable Remuneration)2 -0.00044** -0.0001375*** 0.00035*** 0.00582 
 
(0.0002) (0.0000352) (0.000122) (0.00605) 
Board Ownership 1.453*** 0.3824*** 0.358*** 6.7383 
 
(0.3234) (0.1508) (0.092) (8.2404) 
Shareholders larger 5% -0.486** -0.0492 -0.0368 5.872 
 
(0.20958) (0.0355) (0.0578) (5.567) 
Constant 5.7678*** 0.9216** 0.0513 -5.1647 
 (1.5304) (0.4707) (0.7245) (11.0447) 
     
Observations 493 500 500 496 
R-squared 0.3433 0.2332 0.1873 0.0271 
***|**|* = Significant at 1%| 5%| 10% levels. Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
 
This table reports results from estimating the performance equation, with Fixed Effects 
Model. Standard Errors are robust-clustered by firm. The control variable “Firm Size” 
and the “Time” dummy control variable are not reported. It studies the effect of CG 
Variables (Internal Mechanisms of Corporate Control) on Firm Performance measured 
by Log (Tobin’s Q), ROA, Operating Margin and ROE. Variables are as defined in 
Table V. 
 
